My account is roughly this:
Expert level: Bohmian mechanics
Fluent: many worlds, statistical ensemble, instrumental, Copenhagen (various dialects), collapse by consciousness
Good: QBism, relational, Nelson (stochastic)
Basic: dynamical collapse, consistent histories, quantum logic

I was mostly taught this during my undergrad/grad program many years ago. Ballentine is my reference for basic QM formalism.

Basic:

Bohmian
I watch a lot of Tim Maudlin on YouTube and read posts here by @Demystifier haha.

MWI
I've read the basic development in Everett's dissertation and I watch Sean Carroll talk about it sometimes.

I know they exist:
Consistent Histories, Qbism, Relational.

Not exactly interpretations, but I know it exists:
GRW

I have interest in getting familiar with the ETH and Bohrification approaches but I need to swot up on my C*-algebra.

I never understood the idea of doing QM without interpretations. There is a single set of experimental results known as QM. It is a strange set of results, which allows each author to generate an interpretation distinguishable from the others, yet they all end up explaining the same set of results. I do not understand how an author can fully explain this set of experimental results without ever needing to use an interpretation.

You do need an understanding of what quantities in the math correspond to measurement results, so you can compare the math with experiment. But that's part of the basic theory. It's not an interpretation, since it's the same regardless of what additional "interpretation" you might try to adopt (and nothing forces you to adopt any additional "interpretation" at all).

I will solve the problem using the same terminology you used to present it.

In the scenario I’m describing, at what point are we doing QM without interpreting?

But even among folks who are "orthodox", I think people fall onto a spectrum.

1. Those who haven't thought much about it. The math works. They can do their job. Or maybe they looked but didn't find any interpretation appealing.
2. Those who looked deeply and understand deeply but since there's no experimental way to distinguish between interpretations, they remain agnostic.
3. The hardcore ones who think there really isn't anything deeper than the math + experimental procedure. Reality is described by the math, and that's enough. Questions like "what is there really?" are category errors.

And probably many more~

There's also the issue of course of even getting a consensus on what counts as an interpretation in the first place.

In any case, "explain" is a broad term, but here we're talking specifically about the kind of "explanation" that an interpretation of QM provides. That kind of explanation is not the kind you're talking about here. Why not? Because all QM interpretations make the same predictions. So the "explanations" the interpretations give can't possibly be explanations of why the predictions are accurate in a particular regime--because they're all mutually contradictory, but they all refer to the same predictions! I don't think solid state physicists would accept such a variety of "explanations" for why a particular model works well despite ignoring a lot of details. They would want an explanation along the lines I gave above--which of course could be tested by more accurate experiments that verify that yes, indeed, the details of the electronic structure are indeed negligible in the regime where the current model works well.

QM interpretations, however, cannot be tested by experiment--because they all make the same predictions. The "explanations" that QM interpretations give are "just-so-stories" about what is going on "in reality", not explanations about why the theory itself works.

I don't have as much vocabulary as I'd like in:
- Many worlds.
- Objective collapse (GRW or CSL).
- Consistent histories (@Morbert, Where should I start?).
- Ensemble interpretation (Ballentine).

I know only the basics of:
- Nelson's stochastic mechanics.
- Transactional interpretation (Cramer and Kastner).
- Two-state vector formalism (Aharonov and co-workers).
- Modal interpretations (Van Fraassen, Lombardi).
- Grangier's Context-Systems-Modalities.

Lucas.

I believe there is a historical precedent: Maxwell's electrodynamics. For more than four decades it was not fully understood. The mathematical equations were there (and highly successful), but people kept trying to understand what this theory actually describes. For them an interpretation of Maxwell's equations meant constructing a mechanical model for the "ether". Today the ether has been replaced by the electromagnetic field, and we have understood that the concept of an ether was fraught with metaphysical preconceptions. I'm convinced that the photon concept (and quantum theory in general) is similarly burdened with metaphysical preconceptions that we haven't yet clearly identified.

The plethora of QM interpretations is not a blessing but a curse. It's a symptom, indicating that we haven't yet found a natural interpretation that the vast majority of physicists agrees on. After a century one would expect QM to be thoroughly understood, and debates on its interpretation to subside. (I don't share the view that this situation must be permanent because it lies in the "nature" of QM.)

I believe there is a historical precedent: Maxwell's electrodynamics. For more than four decades it was not fully understood. The mathematical equations were there (and highly successful), but people kept trying to understand what this theory actually describes. For them an interpretation of Maxwell's equations meant constructing a mechanical model for the "ether". Today the ether has been replaced by the electromagnetic field, and we have understood that the concept of an ether was fraught with metaphysical preconceptions. I'm convinced that the photon concept (and quantum theory in general) is similarly burdened with metaphysical preconceptions that we haven't yet clearly identified.

For example, he argues for a view in which quantum fields are fundamental, whereas particles are not. However, he also says: "it's neutral on the interpretations (e.g. many worlds) and modifications (e.g. hidden variables, objective collapse theories) designed to resolve the measurement problem." How can both things be true? How can the idea that quantum fields are fundamental be compatible with Bohmian mechanics, which posits particles as the primitive ontology for non-relativistic QM? That type of contradiction appears several times throughout his writings.

Another one: He states that quantum fields are "real." Leaving aside the fact that quantum fields are not classical, but rather operator-valued fields, does he mean they are ontic? If so, this would be compatible with a many-worlds interpretation of QFT, where the wave functional is the fundamental entity. But then he posits an instantaneous collapse to explain the measurement process. So, what is the dynamical equation for the "real" fields? Nothing is clear.

Lucas.

"it's neutral on the interpretations (e.g. many worlds) and modifications (e.g. hidden variables, objective collapse theories) designed to resolve the measurement problem." How can both things be true? How can the idea that quantum fields are fundamental be compatible with Bohmian mechanics, which posits particles as the primitive ontology for non-relativistic QM? That type of contradiction appears several times throughout his writings.

Lucas.

I think he does view quantum fields as "ontic". I think his criticism of Many Worlds Theory is that the consequence of the theory is so fantastical (e.g., there are "gazillions" of versions of me existing in alternatives universes (branches)) it should be considered less plausible than other interpretations. He seems to say the fact that the math works, in and of itself, is insufficient.

It is unclear exactly what problem Hobson is attempting to solve, given that the conceptual issues in QM are linked to the measurement problem and, by extension, to the question of the theory's ontology. However, he himself acknowledges that his proposal neither solves the measurement problem nor posits a specific ontology. Consequently, the claim that fields are more fundamental than particles lacks any real implications.

Lucas.