Last year, reports surfaced that Indonesia was considering acquiring an aircraft carrier for the first time in its history. This prompted a heated debate over whether Indonesia truly needed an aircraft carrier. In an article published in The Diplomat, I argued that Indonesia didn’t need such an acquisition, at least for the time being, for a variety of reasons. The arrival of the KRI Sriwijaya, as the new vessel is known, thus marks the end of one discussion and the start of another. The key question now is whether Indonesia can turn the ship into a sustainable military capability.

On September 18, the aircraft carrier, formerly known as ITS Giuseppe Garibaldi, arrived at Tanjung Priok Port in Jakarta. The ship was personally welcomed to port by the minister of defense, the commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, and the chief of naval staff. A formal handover from the Italian Navy to the Indonesian Navy took place on September 24, at which the carrier was reflagged and christened with its new name,

The name chosen by the Indonesian government has important symbolic importance. Sriwijaya was a strong monarchy and a respected naval power in Sumatra from the 7th to the 13th centuries.

However, with the ship’s arrival, the most important question is whether and how Indonesia can convert the ship into a viable military asset?

A Ship Doesn’t Equal Capabilities

Aircraft carriers are often associated with naval superiority. Their ability to carry and operate aircraft or helicopters from the sea provides flexibility in projecting power, extending a navy’s range of operations, while also offering strategic options that do not entirely depend on land-based airfields. Moreover, the possession of an aircraft carrier with its various strategic values also brings prestige.

However, an aircraft carrier is not an arms technology that can produce strategic effects independently. Like other conventional weapon technologies, the effectiveness of an aircraft carrier heavily relies on the supporting ecosystem that enables it to operate sustainably and safely. In general, aircraft carriers never sail independently. In operation, the aircraft carrier will be part of a carrier strike group (CSG), which usually consists of an aircraft carrier, a guided missile cruiser, anti-aircraft warships, and anti-submarine destroyers or frigates. In carrying out its operations, the aircraft carrier is also often escorted by attack submarines.

The ITS Giuseppe Garibaldi was always escorted by other warships while still flying the Italian flag. For example, during the Passing Exercise in the Mediterranean Sea in 2020, Garibaldi was accompanied by at least two multirole frigates and one supply ship.

In a CSG, each element has a complementary function, ranging from air defense, anti-submarine warfare, protection of the aircraft carrier, logistics, to command and control. Therefore, the capabilities produced by the CSG are the result of the integration of various platforms, not merely a consequence of the presence of an aircraft carrier itself.

In the context of Indonesia, the issue of the availability of escort and support fleets for aircraft carrier operations becomes is a very important issue. Indonesia indeed now has its long-awaited carrier, but still lacks surface warships to form a CSG as commonly found in the United States or French navies. Referring to the Laboratorium Indonesia 2045 database, Indonesia still lacks 12 frigates and seven fast missile boats to fulfil the government’s Archipelagic Trident Shield defense posture goals. The same goes for the submarine fleet. Indonesia is recorded to still be short of at least eight submarines.

A Carrier For Disaster Operations

The government and the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) have indeed stated on several occasions that the presence of KRI Sriwijaya is not intended for expeditionary combat missions. They argue that the aircraft carrier will instead be prioritized for military operations other than war, specifically humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). For instance, once operational, the government stated that KRI Sriwijaya would join other TNI forces to assist in handling the  ongoing forest fires in Kalimantan. In addition to HADR missions, the Indonesian Navy chief of staff has said that the carrier will be used for defense diplomacy activities, such as port visits.

At first glance, the government’s and TNI’s statement to prioritize HADR missions and defense diplomacy for KRI Sriwijaya sounds rational. Besides the fact that Indonesia’s military posture does not allow for offensive operations, this statement is also expected to prevent diplomatic tensions with other countries, especially in the region.

However, this again raises the question of whether Indonesia truly requires an aircraft carrier. HADR can be a relevant mission for KRI Sriwijaya, but the relevance of a mission does not automatically prove that the chosen platform is the most effective way to achieve that capability. To ensure that KRI Sriwijaya can fulfill its role, Indonesia must still build the right ecosystem around it. For example, if it is intended for HADR missions on land, then Indonesia must ensure the availability of adequate transport helicopters. If Indonesia does not invest in acquiring a sufficient number of transport helicopters, then the KRI Sriwijaya will only become a sitting duck in the middle of the Nusantara sea when a disaster occurs on land.

In other words, if Sriwijaya is to be used for HADR missions, the measure of its success should not stop at the ship’s ability to carry helicopters to disaster areas. A more important question is whether the entire ecosystem built around the ship produces HADR capabilities that are significantly higher than the simpler and more cost-effective alternatives. At this point, Indonesia needs to realistically define the capabilities that it actually wants to derive from Sriwijaya so that it can then build the appropriate ecosystem around it.