Terry Gerton We aired a story a couple of weeks back about NRC’s proposed rule that would make some changes to radiation protection standards. For decades, that’s been guided by the principle of keeping exposures as low as reasonably achievable. What is happening now, and what are you considering as you’re thinking about updating this rule?

Ho Nieh Terry, the answer to the question has to start with some context, with the regulatory reforms that are happening at the agency today, which are very, very comprehensive. In fact, it’s probably the most comprehensive period of regulatory reform in over 50 years of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s history. And the reason we’re taking these regulatory reforms is because there’s an urgent demand for more electricity in the United States due to artificial intelligence, data centers and industrial growth. And nuclear is seen as essential to our nation’s energy security. This is evident by the actions of the president, the bipartisan support from Congress, the substantial investment from the capital markets and private equity, as well as increasing interest from states and increasing public support for nuclear power. So there’s been mandates from Congress and the president for more credible, predictable and efficient regulation. That’s why we’re doing all these rule changes. And the one that you mentioned, related to the “principle of as low as reasonably achievable,” is one of those rules we were asked to go reconsider. The reason why we were reconsidering that is because ALARA has been a principle that has been applied for decades, as you noted, and also in the interview you referenced, and it really is an open-ended expectation. Consider this, Terry: Many of your listeners are probably driving in their cars right now on the Capital Beltway, where the posted speed limit is 55 mph. Imagine if there was another rule that says you have to drive as slow as reasonably achievable to be safer. Well, what does that mean — 50, 45, 25 mph? Think about how different drivers, different police officers, different courts would reach different answers. So, you now have uncertainty and confusion without making the road safer. What we’re doing with this ALARA rulemaking and removing the principle out of our regulations is to really provide greater clarity. So what is happening, Terry, is the standard for safety is not changing. We’re just raising the bar on clarity. The rule is not a reduction in safety. It really is an improvement in how we implement safety at doses that are below the regulatory limits. And as I mentioned, those limits have not changed.

Terry Gerton One of the things we did hear from critics is that the science hasn’t fundamentally changed either. So if you’re thinking about greater clarity, what does that look like? Not just removing the ALARA standard altogether, but what would you replace it with?

Ho Nieh So this is a great topic of discussion because the science has been unsettled in terms of the effects and the risks that occur at very low doses of radiation exposure. I want to be very clear for your listeners: This rule does not attempt to settle that debate. Really, we’re just clarifying what our licensees and the people that have to comply with our regulations must do below those regulatory limits of exposures. So, we’re not talking about less protection. We’re really talking about how we can put in place a more reasonable, clearer, graded approach for what to do when doses increase at levels below the regulatory limits. This is not trying to settle the science at all. The science has really been debated for decades, right? The ALARA has just been a principle to maintain doses as low as reasonably achievable, but it really has been implemented as an open-ended expectation with no clear end point.

Terry Gerton You mentioned in your first response that there is a huge, and growing, interest and investment in the nuclear power sector. What impact on those activities does the ALARA standard, as it’s currently written, have that is driving you to reevaluate it?

Ho Nieh You have to look at the different type of nuclear technologies to understand how the proposed changes to our radiation protection framework will impact. So let’s look at these existing commercial power reactors that are operating today. We have 94 operating reactors that provide nearly 94 or so gigawatts of electricity to our nation’s grid. Those reactors and the companies that operate them have radiation protection programs that have embedded the current principle of ALARA. So the proposed approach to remove the definition of ALARA, put in place instead a graded approach to dose management — again, when you’re well below the regulatory limits — it will likely not result in any changes to current practices. So in other words, for the existing facilities today, this rule, they would already be in compliance with it. And they’re probably doing things that go above and beyond that rule, again, for economic reasons or to control for their purposes. Now, when you look at some of these new technologies, Terry, this is where ALARA has a very practical impact. Designing a reactor, particularly a smaller reactor — these so-called micro-reactors that are being looked at for deployment in remote locations or to be able to be transported for a military purpose or something like that — having ALARA as an open-ended expectation makes it very difficult for a reactor designer to figure out, well, how much shielding material do I need to put around this reactor? What kind of controls are needed when I transport this reactor? Again, it’s this open-ended expectation. So, when we put something that’s more clear in place, designers are able to have clarity in how they design these machines, because it goes into the cost. So I would say this: Good regulation protects people; great regulation does that and it enables innovation and cost-effective implementation.

Terry Gerton Mr. Ho Nieh is chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. So Mr. Nieh, let’s follow that on. You’re talking about graded requirements. You’re talk about flexibility. What’s the strongest evidence you have at this point that these changes can, in fact, deliver the benefits that you’re just talking about without increasing risk to workers, nearby communities or the environment?

Ho Nieh Our process is we look at what is needed to improve our regulations, right? We are a continuously learning organization, and I just want to point out that we’re also an enabling regulator. Part of our mission is to enable the safe and secure use of these nuclear technologies. When you think about what an enabling regulators does, an enabling regulatory aligns its regulations with actual risks. An enabling regulator adapts its regulatory frameworks for new technologies. And an enabling regulator provides for flexibility where safety is maintained here. So it’s very important to kind of understand how we’re really looking at our roles here. Our current regulations have been in place for decades. They were designed for technologies from the 1950s and ’60s, and they have largely stayed intact. So think about trying to force-fit a new type of technology into a regulatory framework that it wasn’t designed for. It’s very difficult, it’s very costly, it takes much longer to work through different types of exemptions and adjustments that we have to make along the way. So really what we’re doing is refreshing our regulations to be that enabling regulator, like I just mentioned. These new type of designs, we’ve received feedback that it would be an important aspect for us to consider in how ALARA is applied. And I’ll say from my previous experience — I’ve been with the NRC for almost 24 years before I went to work for an electric utility that was operating a fleet of nuclear reactor, so I’ve seen this in and out, many ways. And there have been a lot of challenges in the regulatory review process when you are trying to apply a more open-ended standard. What may be reasonable for you may not be the same reasonableness that I would conclude. Really, we’re learning from experience, so we’ve published a proposed rule here. People are going to give us comment on the practical impacts, whether it’s beneficial, whether the appropriate level of safety is maintained. And we believe that we have maintained the appropriate of safety because, as I mentioned, we have not changed the limits. The science is unsettled on the risks below those limits. We’re not trying to settle that. We’re just saying, hey, let’s put something clear and practical in place so people know what to do at these very low levels of dose exposure. We’ll get some feedback into rule-making process, we’ll address all those things as we go toward a final rule, and I think that’s where the evidence will be revealed on whether or not this is the right approach that appropriately balances how we manage risk versus the cost effectiveness of nuclear technologies.

Terry Gerton That balancing question is one I’d like to dig into a little bit deeper because the situation you described as an enabling regulator is really challenging. You’ve got industry pushing for maximum flexibility and you may have communities and workforces pushing for maximum safety. Where do you find the balance point there to give you enough flexibility to promote development and innovation, while still being absolutely sure that you’re not exposing any humans in or around these plants to any unnecessary risk?

Ho Nieh This is where expertise and judgment comes in. The experience that we have of the NRC staff is extraordinary. These are among the best of the U.S. government, and the people that I’ve worked with over the years are dedicated to their safety mission and committed to protecting the public. And when you think about the changes we’re making in our regulations, only very limited circumstances are we actually changing limits. For the most part, all the limits are staying where they are. We are defining what is needed to protect public health and safety and promote the common defense and security, and offering more flexible ways for an applicant or a licensee to achieve the safety goals and security goals. So we are what we would call a performance-based regulator. And that honestly, Terry, is not an uncommon approach. I’ve worked in the international community; many other countries use performance-based approaches. In fact, the United States is largely viewed as a very prescriptive regulatory system where we specify in detail, you know, you have to meet X, Y, and Z, and sometimes that provides a lot of constraints. Especially in an age where we have new technologies that don’t really fit into those constraints that they were originally intended for, it’s really a challenge. So what we are trying to do here is to strike that balance that you point out in terms of what protects the public health and safety and what promotes cost-effective operation and licensing for these facilities. And when you think of the demand for change, again, the United States is not alone in this situation. Many countries — Canada, France, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, among others — are facing the same demand for regulatory reform, because their governments are demanding their nuclear regulator issue faster safety decisions to accelerate deployment in their countries. What we are doing here at the NRC is taking out those unnecessary conservatisms that don’t materially affect safety and provide those licensing frameworks and regulations so that we can really enable these technologies to benefit American society.