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СпутникиРНSpaceXРоскосмосNASA I’ve substantially rewritten the OP after continuing to work through the mechanism and adversarial cases.
The earlier operator-family, quadratic concentration reserve, runoff, fixed-leverage and max-ratio constructions have been removed from the core design.
The proposal now takes a simpler approach: native delegation is pooled and routed by the protocol rather than by delegator or provider choice.
For validator i:
V_i = ordinary native effective balance
If the validator is NED-enabled:
B_i = V_i
otherwise:
B_i = 0
B_i is deliberately not treated as “operator-owned stake.” Ethereum can observe validator effective balance, but it cannot reliably observe beneficial ownership.
The balanced routing target is:
D_i = u * B_i
where D_i is protocol-assigned NED delegated principal.
The reason for the linear rule is split neutrality. If the same hidden actor divides eligible base stake across additional validator identities, its aggregate target allocation does not increase:
Σ_i D_i = u * Σ_i B_i
So the protocol does not need to determine whether several apparently independent validators secretly share an owner in order to make the routing rule neutral to identity splitting.
There is still a second problem: even proportional routing can amplify a concentrated subset of the validator set if only that subset participates.
The current construction handles that with a Delegation Concentration Envelope, or DCE.
For normalized eligible base b_i = B_i / S and delegated principal y_i = D_i / S, define C(m) as the maximum delegated principal that can fit inside any eligible-base slice of size m.
Operationally, this is a fractional-knapsack bound over validators ordered by D_i / B_i.
Let:
e = E / S
d = D / S
and let κ < 1/3 be the largest pre-NED base-stake coalition the mechanism is required to prevent from being pushed across one third solely through NED amplification.
With:
m = min(κ, e)
and a global effective-weight multiplier γ, normally γ = 1, the hard condition is:
κ + γ * C(m) <= (1/3) * (1 + γ * d)
This bounds the post-NED consensus share of any hidden coalition starting at or below κ without requiring Ethereum to identify which validator identities belong to that coalition.
An important consequence is that NED capacity becomes coverage-dependent.
In the balanced state:
D_i = u * B_i
so:
C(m) = u * m
and:
d = u * e
Narrow participation therefore supports little safe delegation, while broad participation supports progressively more. At universal proportional participation, relative amplification tends to zero.
The shorthand I’ve been using for that is:
Flanders earns scale by earning coverage.
The design now also separates three different risks rather than trying to control everything with one parameter:
the DCE bounds hidden-coalition concentration,
D_i <= ℓ * B_i bounds local delegated leverage,
D / S <= Λ bounds total NED exposure.
The OP also now goes further into consensus-weight semantics, pool accounting, withdrawals, historical slashing exposure, finite delegated-liability windows, churn and the exceptional γ safety path.
The main change in framing is that NED is no longer trying to identify or economically punish large hidden operators.
It instead tries to make commercial provider choice irrelevant to native delegation routing, while bounding how much additional consensus leverage delegated capital can create under incomplete participation.
In shorthand:
commercial staking share != native delegated consensus allocation share
As before, I’d especially appreciate attacks on the mechanism, the DCE bound, the split-neutrality argument or the consensus assumptions rather than parameter bikeshedding at this stage.
| # | Наименование новости | Тональность | Информативность | Дата публикации |
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| 1 | ERC-8370: Inheritable Agent Mandates | 0 | 8.79 | 14-08-2026 |
| 2 | All Core Devs - Consensus (ACDC) #183, July 23 2026 | 0 | 15.18 | 13-07-2026 |
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| 4 | EIP Editing Office Hour (EIP + ERC ) Meeting #111, Aug 18, 2026 | 0 | 18.71 | 13-08-2026 |
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| 6 | ERC-8354: Confidential Agent Policy Verdicts | 0 | 12.87 | 24-07-2026 |
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| 9 | ERC-8337: Agent Memory State | 0 | 7.65 | 26-07-2026 |